[From Computer underground Digest] Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 00:57:06 -0500 (CDT) From: bje@RIPCO.COM(Bruce Esquibel) Subject: File 1--"Operation Sundevil" is finally over for Dr. Ripco ((MODERATORS' NOTE: I first learned of Operation Sundevil, part of the US Secret Service's "hacker crackdown" of 1990 described by Bruce Sterling in the book of the same name, the day after it happened. I called RIPCO BBS in Chicago and received a voice message instead of the familiar computer tone. Dr. Ripco and Ripco BBS had been busted, and he bade farewell to us all: This is 528-5020. As you are probably aware, on May 8, the Secret Service conducted a series of raids across the country. Early news reports indicate these raids involved people and computers that could be connected with credit card and long distance toll fraud. Although no arrests or charges were made, Ripco BBS was confiscated on that morning. It's involvement at this time is unknown. Since it is unlikely that the system will ever return, I'd just like to say goodbye, and thanks for your support for the last six and a half years. It's been interesting, to say the least. Talk to ya later. %Dr. Ricpo% The raiders carted off Dr. Ripco's BBS-related computer hardware, books, posters, and other possessions. No computer-related charges were filed against Dr Ripco then or since. Nor was he given any indication that he was under suspicion for any offense. For over four years, he remained in legal limbo, while over $15,000 worth of computer equipment depreciated in government possession. Because of its lively and diverse message boards, the large cross-section of users, and the exceptional competence of Dr. Ripco as a sysop, the BBS became one of the most popular "underground" boards in the country in the 1980s. Despite its reputation as a "hacker haven," Ripco was an open system with at that time one of the best collection of text files in the nation. As we reported in CuD 3.02 in 1991, it also attracted an informant known as "The Dictator," also identified as "Dale Drew." According to court documents, "The Dictator's" reports were the primary "evidence" to justify the Ripco raid. When announcing the news of Operation Sundevil, Secret Service spokespersons lauded its scope--150 USSS agents in addition to local law enforcement support, 13 cities, 28 search warrants, 23,000 seized computer disks--they had no reason to suspect that their then-perceived "success" would quickly turn into a major embarrassment of comic proportions (see CuD 1.09 for Sundevil news). A few eventual arrests--some of which were not Sundevil dependant--were the only demonstrable outcome. Even these were tarnished by USSS and others' hyperbole and similar excesses: The ludicrous claim that this "group" was responsible for what one newspaper reported as "up to $50 million" in fraud costs, the questionable use of an informant, the seemingly indiscriminate manner in which equipment was seized, the lack of subsequent information to convince a skeptical community that the raids' excesses were warranted--soon had Sundevil operatives on the defensive. Some of those responsible for Sundevil, such as USDA Bill Cook and USSS special agent Tim Foley, were successfully sued in civil court for their excesses in raiding Steve Jackson Games a few months earlier. One high-profile state prosecutor closely associated with Sundevil often cautioned critics to "wait until all the facts come out," presumably because the operation and those who planned it would be vindicated. After over four years, vindicating facts have not yet emerged. Quite the opposite: Sundevil was costly, had few significant results, produced few directly-related indictments or convictions, proved a major public relations disaster, and messed up some innocent lives. Sundevil did, however, have some significant unintended consequences. It galvanized the cybercommunity, increased the visibility of The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), and led to the involvement of many individuals and groups in monitoring and shaping legislation affecting the "information infrastructure." Ripco BBS returned to operation a few months after the raid more popular than ever, and has since evolved into a sophisticated system linked to the Internet. The original telephone number is the same, although it now has multiple lines to accommodate all the users. And, for Dr. Ripco, Operation Sundevil has finally come to a close. His equipment was finally returned, although the original files were erased. Ripco can be reached at (312) 528-5020.)) == Dr. Ripco's report on events this week == Hiya Jim, Besides offering greetings I just wanted to let you know that Operation Sundevil is officially closed, I guess. Ripco (the original) came home to roost, the SS finally released the seized hardware and I picked it up today. From what I gathered I was the last one to get out of their hair. I know SJ had some problems but surprisingly, everything seems to be in fairly good shape. My guess is it all probably just sat in storage. Although it physically is back, the system isn't. One condition was to have all the data erased prior to return because of the copyrighted pirate warez lurking about. The guy from the justice department said it wouldn't look right to just return it, would put the feds in the light that it was ok to have it with their blessing. I suppose I could of cut some deal leaving the non-warez intact but after seeing it take 4 1/2 years just to make up their mind to return it, I didn't feel like waiting another 4 for someone to sort everything out. A few pieces of the hardware still have some value today, the old bbs would only have historical value. It would also appear (Secret Service agents) Foley & Golden are/were the butt of some inside joke. Every time their names were mentioned, someone either rolled their eyes or engaged in jest. The new guy in charge (Greg Meyer) seemed pretty cool overall. I know, never trust a fed, but it was interesting he had the same attitude like the guy in D.C. (Josuha Silverman), a hint of embarrassment and total lack of logic behind the whole thing. It appears the computer fraud division, at least here in the Chicago office is more aiming at counterfeiting. Anyway, I wanted to say thanks for everything. I don't know what would have happened if we didn't communicate early on, but it's unlikely things would have ended in a whimper like it did. I'm totally convinced the efforts of CuD, the EFF and CPSR made a major impact on all of this; it put the feds in a defensive position instead of offensive. Things could always have come out better but you have to be grateful for what you have. Thanks much Jim, all your efforts and assistance is deeply appreciated. Bruce Esquibel (Dr. Ripco) bje@ripco.com